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ABSTRACT 
A rigorous framework for safety assessment is established in all countries where nuclear technology is 
used for the production of electricity. On the one side, industry, i.e. reactor designers, vendors and 
utilities perform safety analysis and demonstrate consistency between results of safety analyses and 
requirements. On the other hand, regulatory authorities perform independent assessment of safety 
and confirm the acceptability of safety of individual reactor units. The process of comparing results 
from analyses by reactor utilities and regulators is very complex. The process is also highly dependent 
upon mandatory approaches pursued for the analysis and from very many details which required the 
knowledge of sensitive proprietary data (e.g. spacer designs). Furthermore, all data available for the 
design, construction and operation of reactors produced by the nuclear industry are available to regu-
lators. Two areas for improving the process of safety assessment for individual Nuclear Power Plant 
Units are identified: 
• New details introduced by industry are not always and systematically requested by regulators 
for the independent assessment.  
• New analytical techniques and capabilities are not necessarily used in the analyses by regula-
tors (and by the industry).  
The established concept of independent assessment constitutes the way for improving the process of 
safety assessment. This is possible, or is largely facilitated, by the recent availability of the so-called 
Best Estimate Plus Uncertainty approach.      
1 Introduction 
The paper deals with Nuclear Reactor Safety Technology (NRST) involving fission and water 
cooled or moderated reactors. NRST is established since several decades, starting from the 
discovery of nuclear fission. Well known events, the latest one being Fukushima, have chal-
lenged the sustainability of nuclear technology and undermined the trust of the public, of the 
decision makers and even of the scientific community toward nuclear safety. Innovative ideas 
and proposals are possibly needed to restore the confidence and escape the irreversible loss 
of competence which also feeds the further degradation of the sustainability for this technol-
ogy. 
The legal branch of NRST is known as licensing. A licensing process is initiated each time 
the construction is planned of a new nuclear installation where radioactive material is pre-
sent. Any Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) constitutes a nuclear installation or the concerned facil-
ity. The licensing process aims at ensuring the safety of each NPP unit, as well as at protect-
ing the public and the environment from harmful radiations. 
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A Government Body under the control of a Ministry, typically Industry or Safety-Security Min-
istry in various Countries, is responsible for the licensing process and mandates the modali-
ties which (typically) are part of the Atomic Energy Act and of the Laws in the concerned 
country. The Government Body is known as licenser. The licenser must approve the safety 
demonstration prior to the start of the operation of a facility.  
On the other side, there is the owner of the nuclear installation or facility, which is, typically, 
the operator of the concerned NPP unit or the applicant of the licensing process. The opera-
tor is known as licensee. The operator must fulfill all the obligations set by the licenser, 
namely making available any information detail and data related to the facility. 
In between the licenser and the licensee, there are typically other organizations, or institu-
tions, or individuals: examples are the NPP designer and vendor, consultants including tech-
nical support organizations and research bodies including universities. Those ‘other organi-
zations’ cooperate either with the licenser or with the licensee to finalize the licensing proc-
ess.            
Looking at the above terms the licensing process constitutes a perfect process and there is 
no room for improvement. However, in order to undermine the concept of perfect process, 
also showing its complexities, let’s consider the following facts (just three out of many more 
examples):        
a) In order to demonstrate the safety of NPP, analysts need to calculate temperature 
and stresses in individual fuel pins (thickness of the clad is few tenths of mm) solving 
a multi-scales and multi-physics problem; providing an analogy in aeronautics, the 
given problem is similar to demonstrate the integrity of a crystal glass glued on the 
wing of an airliner following a cycle take-off / trip under any meteorological condition / 
landing.  
b) There is evidently no countermeasure for the falling of a meteorite upon a nuclear fa-
cility. The same falling in the region around the facility may also generate earthquake 
and tsunami beyond the design limits of the facility. The issue here is that the prob-
ability value for meteorite falling may have changed after the facility has been put in 
operation. 
c) Most of the NPP units now in operation have been designed at a time when com-
puters and computational tools and methods were not available. The obvious ques-
tion arises on how the new findings can be integrated in the old designs.   
Furthermore, it is part of the human nature to optimise any aspect, which may generate a 
benefit: this is the basis of progress of civilization. So, designers continuously improve the 
system and regulators continuously improve the techniques to check the design. Namely, 
within the NRST independent assessment, i.e. the safety evaluation made by licenser know-
ing the construction data of the facility and adopting methods ‘independent’ of the licensee, is 
the foundation to finalize the licensing process. So, where is the weakness?  
In the attempt to address the question, two areas for improving the licensing process are 
identified: 
• New details introduced by industry are not always and systematically requested by 
regulators for the independent assessment: for instance, the type of glue used to at-
tach the glass to the wing may produce unexpected effects.   
• New analytical techniques and related capabilities as well as new evidence are not 
necessarily used in the analyses by regulators and by the industry; for instance any 
impact in safety demonstration is calculated from the change in probability of a mete-
orite fall.  
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The experience gained in a recently completed effort to demonstrate the safety of an NPP in 
parallel to the safety demonstration provided by the designer helped in triggering the issue 
(or in answering the question “Where is the weakness?”) and in generating insights into the 
topics of the bullet items above. The concerned effort is the licensing process of Atucha-II in 
Argentina. Because of here irrelevant events, the design of the NPP was completed at the 
end of 1980’s when construction start and stop also occurred. Construction was resumed at 
the middle of 2000’s when the original design - industry was not any more available to supply 
a ‘new’ safety demonstration as requested by the licenser. Consequently, an independent 
safety analysis was needed. The new safety evaluation was completed and approved by the 
licenser at the beginning of 2010’s, [1]. The facility’s detailed construction data and the latest 
computational techniques (i.e. available thirty years after the time of design of the facility) 
were adopted. Namely, the effort implied the use of the so-called Best Estimate Plus Uncer-
tainty (BEPU) approach, see e.g. ref. [2], and the installation and the operation of an experi-
mental facility [3].      
The paper intends to investigate on the two bullet items and, by discussing some of BEPU 
features, to show how BEPU may represent a reasonable solution for new reactor safety; this 
could be of benefit for industry and for regulators and, definitely for the acceptance of nuclear 
plants by the public. 
2 The features of the BEPU approach 
A textbook is needed for a comprehensive description of BEPU; see e.g. ref. [4]. On one 
side, it is straightforward to discuss the outcomes of a BEPU calculation; on the other side it 
is difficult to explain shortly what BEPU is. Hereafter some generic BEPU-definition state-
ments are given, see also Fig. 1 for an overview:  
 The BEPU is a logical process or an approach which connects the understanding in 
nuclear reactor safety (see also licensing below) with nuclear thermal-hydraulics. 
 The starting point for BEPU is the understanding of the phenomena. Thus, BEPU im-
plies the identification of the accident scenarios which are part of the ‘design basis 
envelope’.  
 BEPU implies the existence of qualified computational tools including best estimate 
numerical codes dealing with different disciplines, input decks or nodalizations and a 
method to evaluate the uncertainty. The words ‘different disciplines’ imply the cou-
pling among codes and the ability to qualify the resulting coupled codes. The term 
“best estimate” and “realistic” have the same meaning. Both terms are used to in-
dicate that the techniques attempt to predict realistic reactor system response [US 
NRC Regulatory Guide 1.157, Best Estimate Calculations of Emergency Core Cool-
ing System Performance] 
 BEPU needs the existence of qualified procedures for the application of the computa-
tional tools; see also the discussion in ref. [5]. 
 BEPU needs the existence of qualified code users and of experts capable of evaluat-
ing the results and of establishing whether additional analyses are needed.  
 BEPU needs the existence of ’legal’ acceptance criteria (e.g. suitable licensing 
framework). 
 The application of BEPU implies the deep knowledge of the licensing process in the 
country where the nuclear power plant is built and in the country where the same 
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plant has been designed. Furthermore, advancements in licensing process by differ-
ent international institutions shall be continuously considered. 
 The structure of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) must be adapted to BEPU 
and connections shall be identified among different chapters; this is specifically true in 
relation to the design of the core, the experimental data drawn during the commis-
sioning period of the plant and the design of operational and emergency procedures. 
 A metaphor can be used to describe BEPU: The knowledge acquired in nuclear 
thermal-hydraulics resembles a city suddenly abandoned by inhabitants; everything is 
there at rest and no information is available to trigger the life in the city. A wild-
experienced traveler arriving there feels lost and unable to use his competence and 
the existing and visible knowledge. In the allegory, the wild experienced traveler is the 
(expert) thermal-hydraulic specialist, the city and its components and systems is the 
nuclear thermal-hydraulic knowledge and BEPU constitutes the civilization needed to 
make alive the city.     
 BEPU constitutes a process which implies the widest exploitation of data and infor-
mation in nuclear thermal-hydraulics: this can be derived from Fig. 1. 
 BEPU implies the integration between Deterministic and Probabilistic Safety Analysis, 
i.e. DSA and PSA, respectively, [6]. 
Due to the above, any BEPU report as well as any BEPU finding should be a living document 
or periodically updated. Proposed developments in the area include BEPU for all FSAR, see 
e.g. [7], and the companion paper to the present paper in this Conference, [8]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 – The BEPU process focusing on Accident Analysis and Chapter 15 of FSAR (NOTE: Acronyms and 
symbols in the figure not defined in the paper are, in alphabetic order: ITF = Integral Test Facility; SETF = Separate Effect 
Test Facility; SYS TH = System Thermal-Hydraulics; V & V = Verification and Validation; ṀECC = Mass flow-rate of injected 
Emergency Core Cooling;  Ṁw,COND = Condensed mass flow-rate penetrating the core; Ṁs, G = Upward mass flow-rate of 
steam and gas; Tsat = saturation temperature;  Tw = water temperature).  
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3 The connection with Independent Assessment 
Independent Assessment (IA) constitutes (as already mentioned) a recognized concept 
within NRST which was proposed with the safety technology; so, the IA concept is ‘much 
older’ than BEPU. The message we wish to provide here is that nowadays the implementa-
tion of IA is not usefull without the additional part of BEPU. 
The first step to clarify the message implies the distinction between conservatism and Best-
Estimate. Let’s attempt to distinguish the two terms in a simplified way, also through the use 
of examples.  
In a conservative approach, unfavourable values are used in order to take into account un-
certainties due to limited capability of modelling and limited knowledge of phenomena, and to 
simplify the analysis [IAEA Specific Safety Guide No. SSG-2: Deterministic Safety Analysis 
for Nuclear Power Plants]. In that case, assumed plant conditions and physical models are 
set conservatively. For instance, (i) pressure resistant walls are built with a thickness larger 
than what is resulting from the available theoretical model/equations; (ii) allowed core opera-
tional power is lower than the assumed power; (iii) in the case of the crystal glass glued upon 
the wing of an airliner, the conservative solution to use the glass at the end of the trip is to 
carry it on board into a protective envelope. Expertise possibly coming from previous built 
and operated facilities is needed to confirm the acceptability of conservatism. Thus the de-
signer and the owner of the facility (may) have the needed expertise to fix the conservatism.               
The word ‘Best-Estimate’ implies the use of validated models/equations according to the best 
practice available to the scientific community and the capability to prove the quality of results. 
However, the word ‘uncertainty’ which appears in the acronym BEPU also corresponds to 
lack of precise knowledge. In this case, proper methods, procedures and data are collected 
to estimate the contribution of the lack of knowledge to the end result (i.e. the design or the 
operational parameters of the facility). Qualified groups of analysts (may) have the compe-
tence needed to estimate the uncertainty.         
The last step to clarify the provided message deals with the two bullet statements of the In-
troduction of this paper. 
The industry attitude is toward a more efficient product to win the competition with other in-
dustries (first bullet item). This involves, among the other things, the implementation of feed-
backs from experience and the transport of applied R & D results into the production. Details 
of design, construction and operation are continuously modified (well-known example is the 
configuration of spacer grids in the core). Sample connected-or-consequent facts are: (i) 
safety impact of any change may not be evaluated as relevant; (ii) there is no benefit to make 
available (e.g. to licenser) proprietary data. Definitely, some facility related data may not be 
made available to the licenser, even though the commitment of the licensee to all-data-
access is kept. 
Parallel to industry activity, research is on-going in several areas, e.g. to improve computa-
tional methods applicable for safety evaluations. Licensers (other than licensees) may not 
necessarily be aware of those developments (second bullet item).                                  
Easy inference is that the best possible IA is not performed under present conditions; i.e. not 
all design details are available, not the most sophisticated methods are used. 
The solution is to combine BEPU and IA under a new framework [9]. This means the intro-
duction of a new level of safety evaluation which removes the drawbacks discussed under 
the first and the second bullet item and keeps the IA feature. The proposal in ref. [9] is to 
create a consortium of competence of senior experts (already called COCONUT = Consor-
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tium of Competence in Nuclear Technology) who have access to licensee data, perform IA 
and refer to the licensee, without infringing the data property condition. The same experts 
guarantee the licenser about fulfilment of regulatory requirements by issuing a parallel 
BEPU-based FSAR. The complexity of implementing the proposed consortium is recognized 
together with its cost.       
4 Conclusions 
BEPU is needed to assess the conservatism in the design and the operation of NPP. Possi-
bly, suitable conservatism can only be introduced by NPP designers or owners based on ex-
pertise which comprises operation of similar plants, proprietary best estimate analyses and 
measured data. In other terms, designers / owners of NPP are expected to own best-
estimate information and to make available conservative information to the regulator. This 
covers the best available data and prevents the disclosure of proprietary information. A li-
censer, on the other hand, may not have the expertise of the designer / owner and may not 
be able to fix suitable conservative values for parameters which are input to the analyses for 
safety demonstration. Thus, BEPU may reveal as the only logical approach for the licenser 
for an independent assessment of the licensee submission: the uncertainty in input parame-
ters is derived ‘independently’ and substitutes, and eventually is consistent with, the conser-
vatism of the licensee based on proprietary best estimate information.        
Furthermore,  
a) BEPU process or approach uses knowledge of system thermal-hydraulics. 
b) The BEPU idea may be seen as having a direct connection with the “As Low As Rea-
sonably Achievable (ALARA)” principle for minimizing the contact between harmful 
radiations and humans: BEPU approach implies the best tool to estimate fission 
product releases and the margins to the related acceptability thresholds. 
c) BEPU must be adopted for the entire FSAR (the BEPU extension from nuclear ther-
mal-hydraulics to the entire FSAR topics is not discussed in this paper): this appears 
a logical follow-up of the findings and of the expertise gained by the scientific com-
munity during the last couple of decades in the nuclear safety evaluation area.  
The key conclusion for the paper is the need to combine BEPU and Independent Assess-
ment. A specifically created consortium of competence may demonstrate to be functional to 
this aim within an innovative safety framework.   
Finally, BEPU approach including BEPU used by independent assessors and BEPU covering 
the entire FSAR, guarantees a higher level of confidence in the safety evaluation than what 
is reached and accepted nowadays. Namely, BEPU activities constitute software types of ac-
tivity, as such; the safety level of existing nuclear facilities is not modified by performing 
BEPU analyses; only if inconsistencies are found related to acceptability criteria, changes in 
hardware or safety parameter limits may follow from BEPU studies. However, the completion 
of BEPU activities may be the basis of creating an additional barrier to the release of fission 
products; this can be achieved by considering the extensions of the concept of safety mar-
gins [10]; a well-based series of revised safety signals can be planned following BEPU 
analyses for the entire FSAR.  
The BEPU connected with Independent Assessment involving the application to the entire 
FSAR and the design / implementation of NPP signals continuously measuring the extended 
safety margins, have the potential to reduce by a quantifiable way the possibility of core deg-
radation, disasters like Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima can be prevented.     
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